



THE PRESIDENT'S INTELLIGENCE CHECKLIST



50X1

22 SEPT 1961

~~TOP SECRET~~



50X1

1. Katanga situation



a) The provisional cease-fire was still in effect this morning, but both sides were regarding the present state as tentative. The UN is going ahead with plans to bring jets into the Congo, and Tshombé has reportedly demanded complete withdrawal of UN troops from Katanga;

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b) Adoula appears so far to be holding out against heavy pressure from elements of his government who want strong action against Katanga. Army chief Mobutu

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forces lack sufficient transport or supplies for major operations;

c) On the outskirts of Elisabethville, the 30,000 anti-Tshombé Baluba refugees, short of food, were reported in a dangerous mood and possibly on the verge of spilling out of their camps into the city.

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2. Mexican disturbances
linked to broad anti-
government plot

There is strong evidence that there was an attempt to assassinate or capture Lopez Mateos on the night of 14 September.

50X1
50X1

Our mission in Mexico City believes that the attempt on the President and the 14-16 September terrorist outbreaks may have been links in a conspiracy to overthrow the government directed by politically important elements. The government is now trying to establish the identity of the ringleaders. Lopez Mateos is described as shaken and determined to get to the bottom of the plot.

50X1

3. Harriman's Laos
talks

The Rangoon talks with Souvanna were more satisfactory on the whole than Ambassador Harriman had expected with one important exception: Souvanna is still insisting on drawing entirely from his own followers, rather than including several outside moderates, in making up the center group in a coalition. He indicated, however, that he is determined to beat the Pathet Lao "at all costs" in elections. If the elections are lost, he said, he would fight rather than let Laos go Communist.

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Harriman's later discussions with Phoumi in Vientiane found the latter still deeply suspicious of Souvanna's independence and showing little inclination for serious negotiations with the opposition.



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4. Khrushchev condemnation
of Mongi Slim




He issued a long diatribe against Slim before a group of African ambassadors, including the Tunisian envoy, during the Bizerte crisis. His charge that Slim has not served the best interests of Africa in the UN will probably re-appear in Soviet argumentation against him.  

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5. Soviet nuclear and
missile tests



a) There may have been two more nuclear tests since yesterday, one in the Arctic and the other at Semipalatinsk. There had been four nuclear tests earlier this week,

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b) there was an extended range missile firing into the Central Pacific, approximately 6500 nautical miles, on the 17th and again yesterday 

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6. Prospects for French-Algerian negotiations

[REDACTED]

Both sides have signalled their readiness to resume negotiations. The Algerians, however, are not fully convinced of De Gaulle's good intentions regarding the Sahara. They say that, though firm on Sahara sovereignty, they are flexible on transitional arrangements, but they would like to pin down the meaning of De Gaulle's "mystical language" on the subject. [REDACTED]

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7. Communist activity in South Viet-Nam

[REDACTED]

There are press reports of another major Viet Cong attack on a government outpost north of Saigon, the second this week. Communist guerrilla forces in South Vietnam constitute an increasing military threat and appear to intend to develop a major base of operations in the plateau area of central South Vietnam bordering Laos. [REDACTED]

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8. Conservatives in Ghanaian cabinet want showdown with Nkrumah

[REDACTED]

They are worried by his leftward bend in both foreign and domestic policy, and want him to modify the new economic measures which have caused the present wave of strikes. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] Nkrumah has been taking a tough line internally.

NOTES

- A. There are no signs of a break in the Afghan-Pakistan impasse. Both sides are continuing military preparations--apparently defensive--along the border. [REDACTED] 50X1
[REDACTED] 50X1
- B. The latest assessment of the situation in the Dominican Republic is that those favoring violent action are in the ascendancy among the opposition. [REDACTED] 50X1
[REDACTED]
- D. It is now known that the Soviet-Iraqi arms agreement [REDACTED] 50X1
[REDACTED] provided for the supply of surface-to-air guided missiles to Iraq. A similar agreement was reached earlier with Indonesia and possibly also with the UAR. [REDACTED] 50X1
- E. Sukarno has begun to display some optimism over the chances for a negotiated settlement of the West New Guinea issue. His attitude probably arises from a number of semi-official contacts which he and other Indonesian representatives have been having with the Dutch. [REDACTED] 50X1
- F. Algerian security forces are braced for possible disorders following yesterday's broadcast appeal for demonstrations by General Salan. De Gaulle is on a speaking tour of southern France; [REDACTED] 50X1
[REDACTED] 50X1

50X1

CONCLUSIONS OF SPECIAL USIB SUBCOMMITTEE ON
BERLIN SITUATION--15 August-19 September

1. Soviet statements over the past two weeks and the agreement to talk with the US in New York suggest that Khrushchev has not foreclosed the possibility of a negotiated settlement as an alternative to proceeding with a separate treaty by the end of the year. The Soviets, however, have rigidly adhered to their stated terms--a German peace treaty and a "free city"--as the framework for negotiations. Repeated Soviet and satellite statements reaffirming the year-end deadline for a peace treaty indicate that the Soviets hope to step up the pace of diplomatic exchanges. The Soviets apparently would prefer a Western initiative to convene formal negotiations at an early date, but failing this they will probably try to exploit the UN session to put pressure on the West to negotiate.

2. As part of their general tactics of intimidation and pressure against the West, the Soviets have made diplomatic threats against civil air traffic to Berlin. Some limited harassments, similar to those in the past, appear likely, but will probably stop short of forcible action against air access prior to the conclusion of a peace treaty.

3. Within East Germany popular dissatisfaction--particularly among the youth--remains widespread and continues to be exhibited in a variety of minor antiregime incidents which became more frequent as the 17 September election approached. Refugee escapes to West Berlin and West Germany are at a total rate of 20 to 30 a day. The regime shows concern about the latent discontent and continues to move vigorously and ruthlessly to maintain control over the population. While self-confidence is displayed at the top level of the party, lower echelon party workers seem nervous, overworked, and edgy. Strikes, passive resistance, and even severe local demonstrations remain possible, but the regime presently is prepared to take whatever actions are necessary to prevent serious popular outbursts.

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